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Organizations frequently consider offshore systems de-
velopment in the belief that projects can be completed
at lower cost. While prices quoted by offshore vendors
are often very appealing when compared with domes-
tic vendors, additional risks must be considered when
looking into offshore systems development. These risks
typically take the form of intangible and indirect project
costs which add to the total cost of the delivered system.
This paper describes and classifies these risks, which
fall into three primary categories of security risks, legal
risks, and general risks. Suggestions for incorporating
these intangible and indirect costs into the decision
making process, and their effects on total project costs,
are offered for the offshore v. domestic vendor selection
process.
Keywords: offshore outsourcing, risk, systems develop-
ment
1. Introduction
Organizations are under relentless pressure to
reduce costs to preserve or improve their com-
petitive positions. One of the most costly main-
tenance areas for many organizations is the
Information Technology function (Barthelemy,
2001). An increasingly common choice for or-
ganizations seeking cost reductions is the uti-
lization of third-party vendors outside domes-
tic borders for systems development, commonly
referred to as the “offshoring” of systems devel-
opment. This alternative is based on the belief
that a similar software product can be obtained
from offshore vendors at a lower cost than de-
veloping the system in-house or with domestic
vendors.
Costs associated with in-house and domesti-
cally outsourced systems development have been
studied extensively in the literature. This paper
develops a framework for considering the less
understood indirect and intangible costs associ-
ated with offshoring systems development, and
the effects of these expenditures on the total cost
proposition to the client. In addition to direct
costs paid to vendors, indirect costs - specifi-
cally for additional risks borne by clients when
offshoring systems development - must be con-
sidered as part of the total cost of the system.
Many bona fide risks and exposures associated
with offshoring are ignored due to organiza-
tional exuberance about potential cost savings
of global outsourcing (Goodman and Ramer,
2007). While explicit costs may be lower with
offshore suppliers, the risks and implicit costs
are lower with domestic vendors. When all of
the costs and risk factors are taken into account,
the net advantage of offshoring may be signifi-
cantly and adversely affected (Shao and Smith
David, 2007).
2. Literature Review
The relevant literature falls into three areas of
interest. Discussions related to security issues,
legal issues, and general financial issues are pre-
sented below.
2.1. Information Security
Using external vendors for systems develop-
ment inevitably requires allowing external ac-
cess to an organization’s internal systems. Or-
ganizations can better control access to on-site
information and facilities (McDougall, 2005).
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Traditionally, external vendors may access soft-
ware infrastructures, including the development,
testing, and staging environments of the client.
External access to organizational infrastructures
potentially opens a backdoor through which
hackers can enter, presenting risks that are non-
existent for internal development. It is in-
cumbent upon organizations to maintain secu-
rity standards, regardless of where development
takes place. When multiple organizations are
intimately linked, weaknesses in one can be
used to attack another. Goodman and Ramer
(2007) provide an example of a breach that oc-
curred at Moneygram International, where cor-
porate datawere accessed through their business
partner’s site. Even thoughMoneygramwas not
at fault for the breach, their reputation was still
negatively affected. Federal regulators warned:
“You can outsource the function but not the
accountability" (Goodman and Ramer, 2007).
Exploitable weaknesses in offshore vendor sys-
tems can leave the client organization open to
additional risks and their associated costs. Kark
(2007) discovered that the average cost of a se-
curity breach is between $90 – $305 per lost
record. As a specific example, Monster.com
spent $80 million to upgrade their website after
it was revealed that con artists had mined re-
sume contact information from 1.3 million peo-
ple (Hobson, 2008). Given these examples, it
is incumbent upon organizations to realize the
potential cost exposure when opening up pro-
prietary systems to outside vendors, particularly
if those vendors are based beyond domestic bor-
ders.
Another challenge in dealing with offshore ven-
dors is a lack of standardized security proce-
dures between industries and processes in dif-
ferent countries (Ramanujan and Jane, 2006).
Managers considering offshoring systems de-
velopment must ensure adequate security for
offshored activities (Gonzalez et al., 2005).
Many organizations underestimate the difficulty
of integrating offshore-supplier employees into
their processes and workflows (Rottman and
Lacity, 2006). The challenges include access to
systems and corporate data, human resource is-
sues, and the need to duplicate development and
testing environments. These offshoring issues
must be addressed prior to project launch.
2.2. Disaster Recovery
There are additional concerns with doing busi-
ness in less developed or more volatile regions
of the world. After the September 11, 2001
terrorist incident in the United States, many In-
dian offshore IT services companies created de-
velopment centers outside of India for business
continuity reasons (Chandrasekaran and Ens-
ing, 2004). Recent political events and natural
disasters have caused some business continuity
concerns regarding Indian firms. These include
the ongoing potential for a nuclear confrontation
with Pakistan, earthquakes, and other natural
catastrophes (King, 2005a). Organizations do
not want critical development projects affected
by natural catastrophes, Acts ofGod, or regional
imbalances that may place strategic initiatives
in jeopardy. Risks related to poor local com-
munications and transportation infrastructures,
common in India, sometimes require redundant
backup offshore sites (e.g. the Philippines). In
such scenarios, costs and risks associated with
the redundant sites also need to be considered
(King, 2005b).
Disaster recovery sites are often shared by mul-
tiple vendor organizations, and operate on a
“first-come–first-served” basis. By using a sin-
gle, shared backup site, multiple organizations
face the risk of catastrophic failure when the
‘eggs’ of critical IT backup resources are placed
in a limited number of ‘baskets’ (Snow et al.,
2006). Given the proliferation of development
vendor sites in countries such as India, it may be
necessary for firms to operate multiple recovery
sites aswell, to geographically distribute or even
fully replicate data and applications to prevent
total loss (Twing, 2005).
Offshoring of IT services exacerbates system
vulnerabilities by lengthening lines of com-
munication and increasing the number of peo-
ple, organizations, and computer networks that
touch the data (Goodman and Ramer, 2007).
Legal issues take on added dimensions and sig-
nificance with offshore development. There
are intellectual property and privacy concerns,
which are discussed below.
2.3. Intellectual Property
Intellectual Property (IP) rights are often a gray
area in developing nations, and organizations
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experience increased risks of industrial espi-
onage by competitors. For example, a former
employee of an Indian outsource company al-
legedly offered trade secrets to a competitor
after being fired (Fitzgerald, 2003). An ex-
employee of an offshore vendor attempted to
sell an IT company’s proprietary information to
a competitor because the country had no strong
law enforcement mechanism to protect the com-
pany’s rights. These cases reflect the types of
additional risks borne by companies choosing
offshore vendors. In a domestic relationship,
these risks, and their associated costs, would be
mitigated or eliminated.
Trade secrets may need explicit protection by
contracts in an offshoring relationship. When
offshoring, potential partners must safeguard
confidential information against accidental, in-
advertent or willful misappropriation, misuse,
sabotage, loss or theft. If partners cannot be
trusted to protect trade secrets, offshoring risks
may far outweigh potential benefits. Hence, it is
crucial to review the integrated security and IP
protection program of any potential offshoring
partner. Patent and trademark legalities have
always been expensive and time consuming is-
sues of an offshoring transaction (Pai and Basu,
2007).
The difficulty in defining legal protections for
IP arises in the idea that some countries will
favor local companies at the expense of for-
eign ones. To mitigate this risk, organizations
need to assess a vendor country’s track record
on intellectual property protection, to verify the
extent to which the business interests of all par-
ties will be protected (Djavanshir, 2005). Client
companies should also pay close attention to the
experiences of other companies doing business
in that country.
From a legal perspective, offshoring introduces
other risks. When clients and vendors are head-
quartered in the same country, jurisdictional
boundaries and parameters are clear. Across
borders, the situation is less clear. In perma-
nent work arrangements, employers are liable to
third parties for employee negligence, and em-
ployees have a duty to protect trade secrets and
confidential information (Arnett and Litecky,
1994). In the absence of an employment agree-
ment, as may be the case with offshore work-
ers, companies must take extra precautions to
ensure that information is handled appropri-
ately by contract workers. This may be accom-
plished through non-disclosure agreements, or
other methods to ensure that proprietary infor-
mation used by consultants is not disclosed to
competitors.
Theft of intellectual property can occur without
the knowledge of the affected company. Tra-
ditionally, software developed by a vendor for
a particular client becomes the property of the
client. Should the software company reuse the
code for a different client, the original client
may be unaware that their property is being
resold. Legal systems in some countries may
not be interested in or equipped to deal with
these types of issues (Fitzgerald, 2003).
To address some of these risks, the World Trade
Organization’s TRIPS (Trade-related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights) agreement at-
tempts to standardize the protection of IP by
member countries. However, this agreement is
subject to local enforcement, and few popular
offshore destinations have laws covering trade
theft, although this is starting to change. For
example, India, a popular offshoring locale, has
drafted a patent law that is effective since 2005
(Ramanujan and Jane, 2006).
While popular offshore destinations are moving
to address these issues, client companies must
still invest time and effort performing due dili-
gence of the countries in which they plan to
operate, as well as reviewing the performance
of the offshore vendors. Even with appropriate
efforts, it is sobering to note that, according to
the annual Business Software Alliance (BSA)
Global Piracy Study for 2001, software piracy
rates in India rose from 63 percent in 2000 to 70
percent in 2001 (Sengupta and Rajawat, 2002)
and the estimated total ofworldwide losses from
software piracy has surpassed $50 billion (Busi-
ness Software Alliance, 2009). Organizations
may simply be unable to overcome the risk of
operating in these types of environments.
2.4. Privacy
Different countries have very different laws re-
lating to privacy and security. Many offshore
engagements involve countries where privacy
laws do not exist; or where there is much less,
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if any, ability to enforce them if they did (We-
instein, 2004). This poses a significant risk
to organizational data integrity and security of
proprietary information (Murray and Crandall,
2006; Patterson, 2006; Ramanujan and Jane,
2006).
Offshoring lengthens the lines of communica-
tion and increases the number of people, or-
ganizations, and computer networks that touch
the data (Goodman and Ramer, 2007). These
additional connections with networks in multi-
ple legal and political jurisdictions increase the
risk of illicit access to information and pose
considerable risks to the security and privacy
of consumers’ personal data. When business
processes are offshored, so are the relevant sen-
sitive data. Once the data are offshore, domestic
protections no longer apply and many countries
have far weaker security and privacy laws than
the United States. For example, India has vir-
tually no laws to protect personal and private
data, and it is extremely difficult to use foreign
courts to sue companies that misuse domestic
data (Swartz, 2004).
Customers also bear the risk of privacy loss and
identity theft with personal data entrusted to
companies. For example, a Pakistani subcon-
tract worker recently threatened to post U.S. pa-
tients’ medical data on the Web if claimed back
pay was not forthcoming (Weinstein, 2004). In
these instances, companies must take proactive
measures to control these risks, though it is un-
likely that they can be completely eliminated
(Patterson, 2006). In the specific case of off-
shored medical information, individuals have
no rights under HIPAA to sue either U.S. com-
panies that transfer data or the offshore com-
panies that misuse those data (Swartz, 2004).
Loopholes in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also
prevent U.S. consumers from suing banks if per-
sonal financial information transferred offshore
is released (Swartz, 2004).
Employees of offshore vendors often have ac-
cess to valuable and sensitive customer and
transaction data, such as social security and
credit card numbers (Ramanujan and Jane, 2006).
Such information may be misused for corporate
espionage, white-collar crime and terrorism.
Companiesmust ensure that offshore centers are
capable of maintaining appropriate safeguards
for customer information and requiring them
to implement and maintain such safeguards for
client data. There are no enforceable interna-
tional laws regarding data security, so offshore
centers andU.S. companies need to jointly iden-
tify potential risks and work together to create
an information protection framework (Ramanu-
jan and Jane, 2006).
Reports of sensitive data being stolen or pur-
chased from offshore service vendors increase
concerns about offshore data security (Rottman
and Lacity, 2006). This risk may be mitigated
by distributing subsets of data among multiple
vendors, so that the data become a puzzle that
no one vendor can assemble on their own (Shao
and Smith David, 2007). Risks to data pri-
vacy tend to be underestimated, with the possi-
bility that employee data can be compromised
at the offshore locations, resulting in identity
theft. Organizations experiencing this type of
data compromise face significant monetary loss
or damage to their reputation (Shao and Smith
David, 2007).
2.5. Political Risks
Offshoring means that a crucial organizational
function is taking place in another part of the
world. If this function is suddenly interrupted,
the extra expense required to restart operations
(either onshore or at another offshore loca-
tion) can be considerable (Ramanujan and Jane,
2006). In a survey of senior IT managers, po-
litical risks, specifically relating to the political
situation in a hosting country, are a major con-
cern (Djavanshir, 2005). Offshoring exposes
an organization to risks from political unrest
and instability, wars, confiscations, nationaliza-
tions, and terrorism. These are in addition to the
hosting country’s governmental policies, regu-
lations, and attitudes toward foreign businesses
(Djavanshir, 2005). Any of these exposures
considered individually, or as part of a whole,
represents significant risk to the organization
and potential financial exposure. In some devel-
oping countries, government rules and policies
can change suddenly, and sometimes arbitrar-
ily, based on individual decisions by heads of
state. Political relationships between countries
can also have a significant effect on business
relationships, and can change significantly over
time. Governmental action, expropriation, em-
bargo or simply canceling licenses and permits
for important businesses to operate can have a
Risk Effect on Offshore Systems Development Project Cost 115
considerable effect on business in that coun-
try (Ramanujan and Jane, 2006) and can cause
client companies significant financial loss.
Political risk may also manifest itself in events
over which an organization or its offshoring
partners have no control - such as riots, political
upheaval, new elections and war (Ramanujan
and Jane, 2006). Other events may be caused
by a government, such as an embargo on imports
or exports, increases in tariffs, and new prohi-
bitions on transactions with specific countries.
Any of these could cause an interruption in ser-
vice or even force the termination or abandon-
ment of an offshore relationship leading to un-
intended expense. Businesses prefer to conduct
offshore operations in politically stable coun-
tries (Davis et al., 2006). However, because
wages coincidentally tend to be lower in coun-
tries that may be politically less stable, organi-
zations looking only at explicit costs are often
tempted to operate in such environments and un-
intentionally incur the requisite additional risk.
There are additional non-negligible risks of ven-
dor compromise by organized crime or a hostile
government to procure trade secrets or informa-
tion to be used in financial crimes. Industrial
espionage has often been supported by the intel-
ligence services of foreign governments and the
targets are often companies in nominally allied
countries. In these situations, provider organi-
zations and professionals are subject to forces
beyond their control (Goodman and Ramer,
2007). In the specific case of India, although
continued double-digit growth is expected in the
offshoring market, there is a growing concern
over political stability in the region (Jain, 2006).
Even the policies of non-hostile allied govern-
ments cannot be taken for granted, as the dis-
agreement between Apple and the French gov-
ernment over iTunes IP rights would suggest.
Aside from the challenges of doing business
in other countries, organizations face political
backlash and soured public relations at home
when services and jobs are exported (Weiss and
Azaran, 2007). In the United States, laws are
being written to limit offshoring, and to encour-
age organizations to keep as much work within
the country as possible. A majority of states
have introduced legislation that would affect
companies looking to offshore, or those already
offshoring (Kukumanu and Portanova, 2006).
For instance, New Jersey has banned offshore
outsourcing of state government work (Pfan-
nenstein and Tsai, 2004). Loss of consumer
goodwill in response to offshoring efforts may
end up costing companies well beyond any an-
ticipated cost savings.
The preceding examples also suggest that many
of the risks associated with offshoring may not
neatly fall into easily distinguished categories.
The final category of general risks this paper
will address are financial in nature, and relate
to international currency exchange.
2.6. Financial Risks
Currency values fluctuate, especially in less sta-
ble economies. Organizations must ensure that
contracts with offshore vendors take the long-
term effects of exchange rate fluctuations into
account (Kumar and Eickhoff, 2006). Currency
risks are a major concern, because changes in
conversion rates might reduce earnings, and lo-
cal inflationwill directly affect a supplier’s abil-
ity to operate. For example, firms operating
in South America experienced the effects of
runaway inflation in recent years (Kumar and
Eickhoff, 2006). Firms dealing with European
partners over the past decades have not only
transitioned from local European currencies to
the standardized Euro, but have also witnessed
significant changes in the value of the Euro rel-
ative to the U.S. dollar.
In offshoring relationships, managing this type
of currency risk can become a major issue. If
the customer pays in a currency that falls in
price relative to the vendor’s currency, the ven-
dor will experience a decreased profit margin.
The opposite is also true - the customer must
internalize the cost if the price of its currency
experiences a relative increase. If this issue is
considered in advance, the parties can address
it in their contract through provisions that split
the costs of exchange rate fluctuations between
them. A periodic review, near the time a pay-
ment is due, allows for changing the fee to split
the exchange rate difference between the parties
(Weiss and Azaran, 2007).
116 Risk Effect on Offshore Systems Development Project Cost
2.7. Summary of Offshoring Risk
Management Issues
Risk management is the process of proactively
addressing environmental factors and events
likely to affect a project. Despite the poten-
tial benefits of offshoring, it carries no more
promise of success than in-house development
or domestic outsourcing (Kleim, 2004), and in
light of the additional risks incurred, may actu-
ally be a more doubtful endeavor. All projects
involve some degree of risk. Some risks of off-
shored projects are identical to those faced by
their non-offshored counterparts. Offshoring
exposes firms to additional risks in host coun-
tries (Djavanshir, 2005), and the risks this paper
considers are either unique to or exacerbated by
offshoring.
It is important to note that many of the risks
involving offshoring critical functions have not
been fully recognized by firms engaged in such
activity (King, 2007). Risk assessment and risk
management need to play a larger role in vendor
selection and in continuing relationship man-
agement. By identifying risks, and collecting
and assessing information about them, organi-
zations can incorporate accurate assumptions in
their strategies and become increasingly proac-
tive in mitigating and offsetting adverse out-
comes. There are many ways in which an or-
ganization can manage these risks, but they all
add costs to what is meant to be a cost saving
venture (Fitzgerald, 2003). The cost of manag-
ing these risks potentially offsets the gains from
offshoring in the long run (Kleim, 2004).
3. A Framework for Managing
Offshoring Risks
Successful organizations continuously seek to
improve operational and financial performance.
Systems development is commonly viewed as a
service area, and related costs are often the tar-
get of cost-reduction efforts. One popular cost
reduction strategy is to transfer work to less
developed regions of the globe, with an antic-
ipated reduction in direct costs. This research
studies the potential impact of risk associated
with this strategy, as an indirect cost, on the to-
tal costs of systems development. By excluding
indirect costs of risks unique to or exacerbated
by offshore development, organizations do not
consider the true total cost of offshoring.
The proposed framework categorizes the risks
relevant to this discussion, and presents organi-
zations considering offshore systems develop-
ment with five propositions regarding offshored
projects.
Proposition1: Increased security risks inher-
ent in offshore systems development increase
overall project risk.
The United States places great importance on
the protection of its national computing infras-
tructure. With the implementation of the Na-
tional Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC),
now under the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, the federal government has in place an or-
ganization responsible for safeguarding the in-
frastructure networks and systems of the United
States from attack. Many countries that are oth-
erwise desirable offshoring locations simply do
not have the resources, expertise, or possibly
even the willingness to devote resources to these
types of activities.
Additionally, the national infrastructures in less
developed regions of the world are not of a
level expected by domestic companies. Off-
shoring exposes organizations to risks of fail-
ures of governments and critical infrastructures
such as power and telephone systems, and loss
of faith of citizens in the ability of governments
to function properly (Patterson, 2006). In sit-
uations involving natural disasters, public un-
rest, or war, foreign vendors may take longer
to resume operations due to a weaker national
infrastructure.
Proposition 2: Increased legal risks inherent
in working with offshore partners increase
overall project risk.
The United States has a strong legal system pro-
tecting intellectual property and individual pri-
vacy, and is viewed by the world as a stable gov-
ernment. Operating offshore places U.S. orga-
nizations outside U.S. jurisdiction, potentially
leaving them less protected than they would be
while operating domestically. Offshoring ex-
poses companies to information vulnerability
and security risks that can result from a lack of
regulation and introduces new forms of risk by
Risk Effect on Offshore Systems Development Project Cost 117
creating more opportunities for incursion, acci-
dent, or exposure (Djavanshir, 2005; Goodman
and Ramer, 2007). Many of these incidents
are unlikely to be prosecuted or otherwise held
accountable in many potential host countries.
Proposition 3: Increased risks inherent in
offshore systems development add to the in-
direct costs of software development.
In offshoring systems development, companies
believe that they will receive the expected soft-
ware product, delivered in the expected time-
frame, for a lower cost. The potential challenges
and risks encounteredwhen operating in less de-
veloped regions of the world are often excluded
from the cost analysis. These include additional
risks of security when opening up their infras-
tructure to business partners, increased risks of
extraneous events or Acts of God affecting de-
velopment cycles, legal systems that do not pro-
vide full protection to intellectual property and
customer data, and risks from fluctuating cur-
rencies.
Taken together, these indirect costs can have
unanticipated consequences and affect the over-
all cost to the organization. While risk can
sometimes be shifted to other parties, there is
little protection that can be afforded to an orga-
nization engaged in offshore systems develop-
ment.
Proposition 4: Increased risk management
costs inherent in offshore projects will in-
crease overall project cost.
One of the key components of project manage-
ment is the need to identify and control risks,
which invariably adds to overall project cost.
No project is ever completely devoid of such
risks. Organizations must recognize that off-
shore projects will likely require even greater
attention to risk management issues, due to the
unique challenges in working beyond domes-
tic borders (Kleim, 2004). Unfortunately, this
is frequently overlooked when direct cost sav-
ings are emphasized as the justification for off-
shoring.
Proposition 5: Increased currency risk as-
sociated with offshore development will ul-
timately be borne by the client, increasing
overall project costs.
Dealingwith companies based in different coun-
tries raises the challenges of payments in dif-
ferent currencies. Regardless of which com-
pany will bear the consequences of currency
fluctuations, the client will ultimately bear the
risk. If the payments are to be made in the
client’s currency, this risk nominally shifts to
the vendor. However, most vendors are finan-
cially smaller than their clients, and declining
currency values and the attendant loss of pur-
chasing power may significantly affect the abil-
ity of the vendor to continue operations (Gopal
et al., 2003). Should an extreme situation occur
where the vendor ceases operations, the client
will be forced to locate a new vendor who can
complete the project.
The relationship among the risk categories is
shown in Figure 1. While the risks may fall
into discrete categories, it is also possible that
the specific risks an organization may be ex-
posed to could span multiple categories. In
such instances, and especially if resources are
constrained, it may be of particular interest to
identify the risk items with the broadest expo-
sures as priorities, in order to maximize the cost
effectiveness of risk mitigation efforts.
Figure 1. Risk factor summary and effect on project
cost.
4. Discussion
It is all but tautology that systems development
touches every area of an organization and en-
ables an organization to produce a better prod-
uct, or deliver better service, at the same or
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lower cost. Since it is frequently viewed as a
service center at many organizations, the sys-
tems development function is often the target
of cost-reduction efforts. Despite the integral
role played by systems development in organi-
zational success, companies seek to have this
function performed at the lowest possible cost,
while paying scant attention to other significant
systems related issues. Corollary arguments
about diminished quality of systems are beyond
the scope of this paper.
One of these additional risks is the security of
information systems when working with ven-
dors based in less developed countries. When
partnering with offshore organizations, vendors
will require access into the client’s system, a
potential backdoor vulnerability for the client
and a valuable target for criminals. Consider-
ing that these criminals may be in other parts
of the world, and effectively beyond prosecu-
tion, protecting these systems is now of utmost
importance.
In a global computing environment, customers
may access systems at any time of the day or
night. This places additional emphasis on the
need to have systems available 24 / 7 / 365.
System downtime can have a significant finan-
cial impact. These factors require the ability of
organizations to maintain system availability,
and to quickly recover from any service inter-
ruptions.
With systems development occurring in less de-
veloped regions of the world, there is often less
emphasis placed on intellectual property rights
and individual privacy in some of these regions.
As these systems are being developed, compa-
nies may also provide access to sensitive cus-
tomer data to the vendor, placing the privacy
of their customers at risk. Without appropriate
safeguards, organizations may face significant
financial risk from customer lawsuits or, at the
very least, loss of customer goodwill.
There is also the question of how the vendor
will be paid. Payments to the vendor in the
domestic currency removes exchange rate risk
from the client, yet may place undue hardship
on the vendor in a period of falling currency
values. Payments made in the vendor’s home
currency places the risk of currency fluctuations
squarely on the client and may cause project
costs to expand beyond original estimates. In
either situation, the client bears the risk of fluc-
tuating currency as they may be forced to pay
the vendor in a weaker currency, or deal with a
financially unstable vendor.
The additional risks inherent in performing sys-
tems development in less developed regions of
the world are often overlooked, either inadver-
tently or deliberately, since the associated costs
are often intangible and indirect, but may still
be considerable. Offshore systems development
projects are subject to the same inherent risks
as domestic systems development projects, plus
the additional risks, as previously described,
which add to the overall cost to the organiza-
tion. The contention of this paper is that tra-
ditional software development risks cannot be
overcome but only managed, yet offshore sys-
tems development includes additional risks, and
their requisite costs, which are not encountered
in a domestic environment, but must be factored
into the total cost of any project.
In the final analysis, offshore systems devel-
opment places additional risks on an organi-
zation which may not be fully understood, and
hence not properly mitigated. In certain circum-
stances, it is possible to shift this risk to other
parties. In other circumstances it is not, and
with offshore software development projects,
the challenges are often greater. In many situa-
tions, it is simply impossible to transfer this risk
to other parties, and the client company must
ultimately bear the full burden of risk inherent
in these projects, including the additional risks
inherent in working with offshore vendors.
It is universally acknowledged that risk carries
associated costs. In addition to the lower costs
usually quoted by offshore vendors, the added
costs of risk must be factored in. These indirect
costs are seldom considered by companies at the
outset of a project, yet may become painfully
apparent once the project is under way. Igno-
rance is not bliss, and failure to account for the
added risks of offshoring and their associated
costs can have dire consequences for organiza-
tions that choose to see only the rosy picture of
lower direct costs. This paper provides a frame-
work to assist organizations in factoring in all of
the costs of offshoring a systems development
project.
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5. Future Research
This paper presents a review of relevant litera-
ture and creates a preliminary framework, lay-
ing the foundation for future research in this do-
main. The propositions offered need to be trans-
lated into testable hypotheses, which defines the
next stage in the authors’ research agenda. In
addition, the means by which to empirically val-
idate the research model and test these hypothe-
ses need to be formalized. Assessing risks in
the context of finance and engineering projects
is well documented, and many examples from
the literature can be applied within the scope
of this framework with little alteration. The
authors foresee their greatest challenge in iden-
tifying organizations of sufficient scale or of
similar characteristics to permit comparisons of
offshored v. domestically outsourced develop-
ment.
6. Conclusion
Organizations considering offshoring systems
development need to be aware of the additional
risks incurred by working beyond domestic bor-
ders. Systems development projects are risky
enough in their own right, and working with
partners that are potentially beyond reach intro-
duces a number of other challenges that must
be included in the final analysis. The challenge
facing many organizations is lack of awareness
of, or a deliberate decision to ignore these addi-
tional risks when considering offshore systems
development. The increased risks of offshoring
do have significant associated costs that need
to be considered and included in the final cost
calculation. This paper has provided a frame-
work to summarize these risks and identified
a series of issues for organizations to consider
when offshoring is an option.
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